This interactive map and sortable table show the facilities that fuel America’s nuclear power plants, all 123 facilities tracked here across the six stages of the nuclear fuel cycle: mining & milling (20), conversion (2), enrichment (9), deconversion (3), fuel fabrication (8) and spent-fuel storage (81), each color-coded by type. Facilities are shown across all statuses: active (95), standby (7), in development (12) and decommissioned (9). The spent-fuel storage entries enumerate the independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) at every operating and shut-down commercial reactor site, plus the away-from-reactor and consolidated facilities. Together these facilities keep an enormous tonnage of uranium moving through the fuel cycle: in 2024 US utilities purchased about 55.9 million pounds of uranium (U₃O₈ equivalent), roughly 21,500 metric tons, more than any other country in the world, and US reactors were fueled with about 50 million pounds of it that year (U.S. EIA, 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report).
Sources, basis and how the totals reconcile
Sources. US purchases are EIA Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 3, Uranium purchased by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors by origin country and delivery year, 2024 deliveries, collected on Form EIA-858 and released September 30, 2025. Enrichment is the same report’s Table 16, Purchases of enrichment services by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors by origin country and year, also 2024 deliveries. World mine production is the World Nuclear Association World Uranium Mining Production table, 2024 production year, which draws on OECD NEA and IAEA, Uranium 2024: Resources, Production and Demand (the Red Book).
Totals. All three charts reconcile exactly against their published totals. World production sums to 60,213 tonnes U, purchases to 55,921 thousand pounds U₃O₈e and enrichment to 15,159 thousand SWU. Percentages use largest-remainder rounding at two decimal places so each chart adds to 100.00%.
Withheld data. EIA suppresses origin countries where reporting would disclose an individual company’s position, marking them W. On the purchases chart for 2024 that covers the European Union, France, Gambia, Japan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and an unknown-origin line, adding to 986 thousand pounds, the difference between EIA’s stated foreign total of 51,590 and the 50,604 that the named countries account for. On the enrichment chart it covers China, an unspecified Europe line and an other line, adding to 1,954 thousand SWU against a stated foreign total of 12,267. In both cases the withheld material is grouped into one slice rather than dropped.
A note on EIA’s own summary. The country shares quoted in EIA’s written summary sum to 102%, because the foreign countries are given as a share of foreign purchases while the United States is given as a share of all purchases. The charts here use one consistent denominator, total purchases, so Canada reads 33.26% rather than the 36% in EIA’s prose.
What the three charts show. They follow the fuel through the front end of the cycle. The first is where the world digs uranium out of the ground, the second is where American reactor operators actually bought it, and the third is where that material was enriched before it reached a reactor. Ore is milled into yellowcake at or near the mine and is not shipped as raw rock, so origin country means the country of mining on the first two charts, while the third is the country in which the enrichment plant sits. The United States is a named slice on the purchases and enrichment charts but sits inside Others on the production chart, because domestic mine output is roughly 1% of world supply.
Share of global output by country, 2024
Share by origin country of uranium bought by US reactor operators
Share of enrichment services purchased, by country of plant, 2024
| # | Facility | Type | Site | State | Nearest city | Operator | Status | Output / product | Capacity | Began ops |
|---|
Ore is extracted by underground, open-pit or in-situ recovery (ISR) methods, then chemically processed and dried into a concentrate called yellowcake (U₃O₈).
Yellowcake is purified and converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas, the chemical form required for enrichment.
Gas centrifuges (or laser separation) raise the concentration of fissile U-235 from ~0.7% to the 3–5% (LEU) or up to ~20% (HALEU) reactors need.
Reactive UF₆, including the large depleted "tails" stream, is converted back into stable uranium oxide for safe handling, storage or disposal.
Uranium-dioxide powder is pressed into ceramic pellets, sealed into metal cladding tubes, and bundled into finished fuel assemblies for the reactor core.
Used assemblies cool in on-site pools, then move to dry casks at the reactor or at away-from-reactor and consolidated interim storage facilities.
The front end runs from mining & milling (producing yellowcake), to conversion (into UF₆ gas), to enrichment (raising U-235 content), to deconversion (stabilizing UF₆ into oxide), to fuel fabrication (making fuel assemblies). The back end covers spent-fuel storage after the fuel has been used in a reactor.
The United States has a single commercial uranium conversion facility, Honeywell's Metropolis Works in Illinois, and one large commercial enrichment plant, URENCO USA in New Mexico. Orano Enrichment USA is separately licensed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Centrus Energy's American Centrifuge Plant in Ohio produces HALEU for advanced reactors, and Global Laser Enrichment is developing a laser-based plant in North Carolina.
Most current US uranium comes from in-situ recovery (ISR) operations in Wyoming, Texas and Nebraska, plus the White Mesa Mill in Utah, the only operating conventional mill in the country. US production rebounded to a six-year high in 2024 as prices recovered.
Spent fuel is first cooled in pools at the reactor, then transferred to dry casks held in independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). With no operating federal repository, the NRC counts 37 states with at least one ISFSI, of which 35 have one in service. Most sit at operating reactor sites, others remain on decommissioned plant sites after the reactor is gone, and, pending legal and policy developments, two licensed consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs) in Texas and New Mexico await fuel from multiple sites. The Site column on this page shows which installations are at a power-plant site.
High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) is enriched to between about 5% and 20% U-235. Many advanced and small modular reactor designs require it, but US commercial production is only beginning to scale up, led by the American Centrifuge Plant in Ohio.
The 118 facilities here are dominated by one category: spent-fuel storage, which accounts for the large majority of sites. That is a direct consequence of US policy; with no permanent repository, used fuel accumulates in dry casks at the reactor sites that produced it, turning every nuclear plant into a long-term storage location. The front of the fuel cycle, by contrast, is strikingly thin: a handful of mining, conversion, enrichment and fabrication plants supply the entire fleet.
That imbalance is the strategic story. US reactors consume more uranium than any other country, roughly 50 million pounds a year, yet most enrichment and conversion capacity sits abroad, and domestic mining is a fraction of what it once was. Recent federal efforts to rebuild conversion and enrichment capacity, and to stand up high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) supply for advanced reactors, are attempts to close that gap. The map makes the vulnerability visible: a vast, reliable reactor fleet resting on a remarkably small domestic fuel base. See how the reactors themselves are changing in our nuclear fleet analysis.
The two are not the same. Kazakhstan digs up 38.64% of world production but supplied 22.13% of US purchases, while Canada mines 23.76% and supplied 33.26%, the largest single source. Australia is the reverse of Kazakhstan, at 7.64% of world output for 15.34% of US purchases. US mines produce about 1% of world uranium, yet US-origin material was 7.75% of what American reactor operators bought in 2024, up from 5% in 2023, because purchases draw on inventory and older domestic production as well as current mining.
Of the uranium delivered to US reactor operators in 2024, whether as yellowcake, natural UF₆ or already-enriched uranium, 92.25% was foreign-origin and only 7.75% came from US mines, as the middle chart above shows. The enrichment picture is less lopsided but more strategically awkward: US plants performed 19.08% of the separative work American reactors bought, while Russia alone supplied 20.07%, more than any single country including the United States. Western Europe together accounted for a further 47.96% across France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. The Russian share is falling, from 4,141 thousand SWU in 2023 to 3,043 in 2024 as the import ban phases in, and the domestic build-out tracked on this page, including the American Centrifuge Plant at Piketon and Orano’s Oak Ridge project, is what is meant to replace it.