This interactive map and sortable table show the facilities that fuel America’s nuclear power plants, all 168 facilities tracked here across the seven stages of the nuclear fuel cycle: mining & milling (42), conversion (4), enrichment (15), deconversion (3), fuel fabrication (21), recycling & reprocessing (3) and spent-fuel storage (80), each color-coded by type. Facilities are shown across all statuses: active (99), standby (11), in development (46) and decommissioned (12). The in-development set has grown sharply: two conversion projects sit in NRC pre-application against a single operating plant, three enrichers broke ground or signed construction contracts during 2026, and a recycling and reprocessing stage has emerged that had no commercial presence a year ago. The spent-fuel storage entries enumerate the independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) at every operating and shut-down commercial reactor site, plus the away-from-reactor and consolidated facilities. Across all commercial sites, the Department of Energy’s inventory recorded 325,787 spent fuel assemblies holding 94,443 metric tons of initial heavy metal discharged through 31 December 2024. Dry cask storage has overtaken the pools: 183,775 assemblies and 53,332 MTiHM sit in ISFSIs across 4,169 casks, against 142,012 assemblies and 41,111 MTiHM still in wet storage, so 56.5% of the tonnage is in dry casks. That share has grown relentlessly; dry storage held just 2,407 MTiHM in 2000 and 15,357 MTiHM in 2010. Together these facilities keep an enormous tonnage of uranium moving through the fuel cycle: in 2024 US utilities purchased about 55.9 million pounds of uranium (U₃O₈ equivalent), roughly 21,500 metric tons, more than any other country in the world, and US reactors were fueled with about 41 million pounds in 2025, down 15% from 48 million in 2024 (U.S. EIA, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 18).
This page maps the fuel cycle as it operates today, so the mining and milling section covers only active, standby and in-development sites. Closed and remediated uranium mines and mills, including the UMTRCA disposal sites managed by the Department of Energy, are mapped on the Uranium Mines page alongside more than 13,000 historic locations.
Sources, basis and how the totals reconcile
Sources. US purchases are EIA Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 3, Uranium purchased by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors by origin country and delivery year, 2025 deliveries, and enrichment is the same report’s Table 16, Purchases of enrichment services by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors by origin country and year, also 2025. Both are collected on Form EIA-858 and were released in August 2026. World mine production is 2024, the latest year the World Nuclear Association has published. Enrichment is the same report’s Table 16, Purchases of enrichment services by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors by origin country and year, also 2024 deliveries. World mine production is the World Nuclear Association World Uranium Mining Production table, 2024 production year, which draws on OECD NEA and IAEA, Uranium 2024: Resources, Production and Demand (the Red Book).
Totals. All three charts reconcile exactly against their published totals. World production sums to 60,213 tonnes U for 2024, purchases to 46,871 thousand pounds U₃O₈e for 2025 and enrichment to 12,710 thousand SWU for 2025. Percentages use largest-remainder rounding at two decimal places so each chart adds to 100.00%.
Withheld data. EIA suppresses origin countries where reporting would disclose an individual company’s position, marking them W. On the purchases chart for 2025 that covers Japan, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and an unknown-origin line, adding to 1,628 thousand pounds, the difference between EIA’s stated foreign total of 43,495 and the 41,867 that the named countries account for. Russia was named in every year through 2024 and is withheld for the first time in 2025. On the enrichment chart for 2025 it covers China, Germany, an unspecified Europe line and an other line, adding to 1,378 thousand SWU against a stated foreign total of 9,780. In both cases the withheld material is grouped into one slice rather than dropped.
A note on EIA’s own summary. In its written summaries EIA gives the foreign countries as a share of foreign purchases while giving the United States as a share of all purchases, so the quoted shares do not sum to 100%. The charts here use one consistent denominator, total purchases, so Canada reads 32.44% rather than the higher figure EIA’s prose implies.
What the three charts show. They follow the fuel through the front end of the cycle. The first is where the world digs uranium out of the ground, the second is where American reactor operators actually bought it, and the third is where that material was enriched before it reached a reactor. Ore is milled into yellowcake at or near the mine and is not shipped as raw rock, so origin country means the country of mining on the first two charts, while the third is the country in which the enrichment plant sits. The United States is a named slice on the purchases and enrichment charts but sits inside Others on the production chart, because domestic mine output is roughly 1% of world supply.
Share of global output by country, 2024
Share by origin country of uranium bought by US reactor operators, 2025
Share of enrichment services purchased, by country of plant, 2025
| # | Facility | Type | Site | State | Nearest city | Owner | Operator | Status | Uranium Form/Stage | Capacity | Output | Began ops |
|---|
Ore is extracted by underground, open-pit or in-situ recovery (ISR) methods, then chemically processed and dried into a concentrate called yellowcake (U₃O₈).
Yellowcake is purified and converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas, the chemical form required for enrichment.
Gas centrifuges (or laser separation) raise the concentration of fissile U-235 from ~0.7% to the 3–5% (LEU) or up to ~20% (HALEU) reactors need. For scale, Urenco produces about 17.2 million SWU a year worldwide, while the entire operating US capacity is 4.3 million SWU at a single plant in New Mexico, which is why five separate enrichment projects are being built at once.
Reactive UF₆, including the large depleted "tails" stream, is converted back into stable uranium oxide for safe handling, storage or disposal.
Uranium-dioxide powder is pressed into ceramic pellets, sealed into metal cladding tubes, and bundled into finished fuel assemblies for the reactor core.
Used fuel is chemically or electrochemically separated to recover uranium, plutonium and valuable isotopes, reducing the volume and longevity of the waste. Commercially dormant in the US since the 1970s, this stage is now being rebuilt.
Used assemblies cool in on-site pools, then move to dry casks at the reactor or at away-from-reactor and consolidated interim storage facilities.
The front end runs from mining and milling, which produces yellowcake, to conversion into UF₆ gas, to enrichment, which raises the share of U-235, to deconversion, which stabilises leftover depleted UF₆ into a storable oxide, to fuel fabrication, which makes the finished assemblies. The back end covers spent-fuel storage once the fuel leaves the reactor, and recycling and reprocessing, which recovers usable material from it. This map tracks all seven. The seventh is the newest: commercial reprocessing has no operating presence in the United States, and all three entries here are in development.
One commercial conversion plant and two operating enrichment plants. Conversion happens only at Metropolis Works in Illinois, owned by Solstice Advanced Materials since its separation from Honeywell, with two more plants in NRC pre-application, FluxPoint in Texas and UR&C in Wyoming. Enrichment runs at URENCO USA in New Mexico, which announced an expansion of 2.1 million SWU in June 2026, and at Centrus Energy’s American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, the only licensed HALEU producer in the country. Nine further enrichment projects are in development, among them Orano’s Project Ike at Oak Ridge, a roughly $5 billion plant that applied to the NRC in early 2026 and expects to produce LEU from 2031, General Matter’s plant at Paducah, Global Laser Enrichment’s $1.76 billion laser facility also at Paducah, and smaller ventures from Hexium, LIS Technologies and Nusano.
Almost all of it comes from in-situ recovery, which dissolves uranium underground and pumps it to the surface, in Wyoming and Texas. Production reached 2.1 million pounds of U₃O₈ in 2025, more than triple the 677,000 pounds of 2024 and the highest since 2016. Five ISR plants were operating at the end of 2025, Lost Creek, Smith Ranch-Highland, Ross Central Processing and Willow Creek in Wyoming and Alta Mesa in Texas, with a combined capacity of 13.3 million pounds a year. Two more began producing in April 2026: Burke Hollow in Texas, the first new in-situ recovery mine in the country in over a decade, and Shirley Basin in Wyoming. The White Mesa Mill in Utah remains the only operating conventional mill; Shootaring Canyon in Utah and Sweetwater in Wyoming are on standby. Employment reached 711 full-time person-years in 2025, the highest since 2014. Output is rising steeply but still meets only a small share of what US reactors consume.
It is cooled in pools at the reactor, then moved into dry casks held in independent spent fuel storage installations, or ISFSIs. This map lists 80 of them across 37 states. Many sit at operating reactors, others remain on sites where the reactor has already been dismantled. With no federal repository in operation, the NRC has licensed two consolidated interim storage facilities away from any reactor: Interim Storage Partners in Andrews County, Texas in 2021, and Holtec’s HI-STORE in New Mexico in 2023. Both were challenged, and the Fifth Circuit vacated both licences. On 18 June 2025 the Supreme Court reversed that decision 6 to 3 in NRC v. Texas, holding that neither Texas nor the company challenging the licence had been a party to the NRC proceeding and so neither could seek review. The Court expressly declined to decide whether the NRC may license away-from-reactor storage at all, so the underlying question is unsettled, both states continue to object, and Texas law still bars such storage. The ruling did not save the New Mexico project: in October 2025, with its licence restored, Holtec cancelled HI-STORE anyway, citing an untenable path forward in the state, and in January 2026 the Supreme Court declined a further challenge to that licence. Interim Storage Partners in Texas is now the only licensed facility still pursuing construction.
High-assay low-enriched uranium is enriched to between about 5% and 20% U-235, against roughly 5% for the fuel used in today’s reactors. Most advanced and small modular designs need it, and before 2025 no Western plant made it in quantity. Centrus’s American Centrifuge Plant is the only licensed US producer: it delivered more than 1,900 kilograms under a Department of Energy demonstration contract that ran to June 2026, at about 900 kilograms a year. Scaling up is now funded. Centrus produces about 1 tonne a year from the pilot cascade and states an objective of up to 6 tonnes a year by the first quarter of 2029, and has signed a supply agreement with X-energy and a letter of intent with Oklo for deliveries from that year.
Federal money and the end of Russian supply. The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act of 2024 bans Russian enriched uranium, with waivers available only through 2027, which removed roughly a fifth of the fuel the US fleet had relied on. In January 2026 the Department of Energy awarded $2.7 billion across three ten-year task orders of $900 million each, to Centrus and General Matter for HALEU capacity and to Orano for LEU, with a further $28 million to Global Laser Enrichment. The supporting industry is being rebuilt alongside it: BWXT opened a centrifuge manufacturing development facility at Oak Ridge in January 2026, and Centrus began manufacturing centrifuges domestically in December 2025. This is why 46 of the 168 facilities on this map are in development rather than operating.
The 168 facilities here are dominated by one category: spent-fuel storage, which accounts for 80 of them, just under half. That is a direct consequence of US policy; with no permanent repository, used fuel accumulates in dry casks at the reactor sites that produced it, turning every nuclear plant into a long-term storage location. The front of the fuel cycle, by contrast, is strikingly thin: a handful of mining, conversion, enrichment and fabrication plants supply the entire fleet.
That imbalance is the strategic story. US reactors consume more uranium than any other country, and their operators bought about 47 million pounds in 2025, yet most enrichment and conversion capacity sits abroad and domestic mining supplies only a sliver of it. US mines produced 2.1 million pounds in 2025, more than triple the previous year and the most since 2016, which still amounts to roughly 4% of what the fleet purchased. Recent federal efforts to rebuild conversion and enrichment capacity, and to stand up high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) supply for advanced reactors, are attempts to close that gap. The map makes the vulnerability visible: a vast, reliable reactor fleet resting on a remarkably small domestic fuel base. See how the reactors themselves are changing in our nuclear fleet analysis.
The two are not the same. Kazakhstan digs up 38.64% of world production but supplied 28.44% of US purchases in 2025, while Canada mines 23.76% and supplied 32.44%, the largest single source for a second year. Australia is the reverse of Kazakhstan, at 7.64% of world output for 15.10% of US purchases. US mines produce about 1% of world uranium, yet US-origin material was 7.20% of what American reactor operators bought, because purchases draw on inventory and older domestic production as well as current mining. Ukraine appears for the first time at 2.25%, and Russia falls out of the named list entirely.
That gap is the strategic story. EIA withheld Russia’s 2025 uranium purchases to avoid disclosing an individual company’s position, and the table bounds how small the figure must be: the eight named foreign suppliers account for 41,867 thousand pounds against a stated foreign total of 43,495, so every withheld country together holds just 1,628 thousand pounds, 3.47% of all purchases, shared with Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, the United Kingdom and an unknown-origin line. Projecting the 2021 to 2024 series forward puts Russia near 600 thousand pounds, about 1.3% of purchases, against 6,314 in 2021. Enrichment went the other way. Russian SWU purchases rose from 3,043 to 3,284 thousand in 2025, and at 25.84% of the total Russia enriched more uranium for American reactors than the United States did at 23.05%, for a fifth straight year. Buying less Russian uranium has not yet meant buying less Russian enrichment.
Capacity and output are not the same thing, and this page keeps them apart. For mining and milling, the Capacity | Output column gives rated capacity on the left and, where a facility is producing, its actual output on the right. Mill and heap-leach capacity is in short tons of ore per day and in-situ recovery capacity in pounds U₃O₈ per year, taken from Table 5 of EIA’s Domestic Uranium Production Report, with production from Table 1 of the same report; where EIA publishes no figure, the capacity comes from the operator’s own technical report or SEC filing and the record says which. The two halves are not the same measure for every facility type: in-situ recovery plants and the mill report finished U₃O₈ produced, while conventional mines report contained U₃O₈ in ore mined, which is later processed at a mill, so the two are not additive. The Owner | Operator column names the company that owns the facility, with its parent and any significant partners and their percentages where those are published. For 157 of the 168 records the owner and the operator are the same company. Where they differ, which is almost always a government-owned site run under contract, the operator is named in brackets: the two depleted UF₆ plants are Department of Energy assets operated by Mission Conversion Services Alliance, and the Piketon lead cascade was licensed to Centrus under a DOE contract. The Capacity | Output column gives two figures in a fixed order: rated or licensed capacity on the left, most recent actual output on the right. For mines and mills the capacity is EIA’s production capacity, which is what the plant can process, and this often differs from what the regulator permits. Lost Creek is shown at 2.0 Mlb against a licensed 2.2 Mlb; Willow Creek at 1.3 Mlb against a licensed 4.0 Mlb; Smith Ranch-Highland at 5.5 Mlb against a licensed 2 Mlb for the mine and 4 Mlb for the mill; Crow Butte at 1.0 Mlb against an NRC licence for 2.0 Mlb. EIA is used here because it is the one basis applied consistently to every plant; each profile gives the licensed figure where it differs. Where a figure does not exist it says No rated capacity; where it exists but is not disclosed it says Not published; where a facility is not producing it says None. Storage sites hold fuel rather than making it, so they show only their inventory. The reasons behind a missing figure are in each facility’s profile rather than the table. Conventional mines are absent from EIA’s capacity tables and carry no rated capacity in any published source. Of the 88 facilities that produce something, 32 publish no capacity figure and 66 are not currently producing. Some of those gaps are structural: Nuclear Fuel Services and BWXT’s Nuclear Operations Group hold NRC Category I licences, so their throughput is not public; the Three Crow expansion feeds the Crow Butte plant and has no rating of its own by design; General Matter has declined to say what its Paducah plant will produce; and EIA records the Jab and Antelope, Kingsville Dome and Vasquez projects as having no production capacity at all. Several entries give two figures because a licensed ceiling and an operating capability are different things, and on this page they can differ by a factor of two: Crow Butte is licensed for 2 Mlb a year against a production capacity of 1 Mlb, Hobson for 4 Mlb against a physical 2 Mlb, and enrichment plants are shown with installed and licensed capacity side by side. Where no capacity has ever been published the field says so explicitly with the date, rather than being left blank, because the gap belongs to the operator rather than to this page. Mining and milling output is given in pounds of U₃O₈ per year, converting from tonnes of uranium at 2,599.79 lb per tU where a source used that unit. Enrichment stays in separative work units, which measure separation effort and have no mass equivalent; mill throughput stays in short tons of ore per day; and spent fuel stays in metric tons of initial heavy metal, as every source in that field reports it.
Spent fuel figures are now on one vintage. Both the national totals above and the per-site inventories in the storage records come from the Department of Energy’s Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory of December 2025, and are stated as of 31 December 2024, so they can be compared with each other. Two records are exceptions: the Crane Clean Energy Center is a shutdown reactor awaiting restart and is tabulated separately as of 31 December 2022, and GE Morris is an away-from-reactor pool outside the operating-reactor tables. Site figures cover commercial spent fuel only, so the defence and research inventories at Idaho National Laboratory and the TMI-2 core debris are described rather than counted.